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By Mohamed A. El-Khawas

I

n a recent issue of The American
Scholar, Leila Fawaz, an associate
professor of history and diplomacy at
Tufts University, wrote:

“The conflict [in Lebanon] since 1975,
although it has an internal Lebanese di
mension, has also been a theater of war for
all the hostile powers of the Middle East: a
Syrian war, an Israeli war, a Palestinian
war, an Arab-Israeli war, an Arab war, a
great powers and superpowers conflict.”1
The situation Professor Fawaz de
scribes has come about because the feud
ing Lebanese factions — the Christians
(Maronites), the Muslims (mainly Shiites)
and the Druze — plus the Palestinians
have been susceptible to external pres
sures as the civil strife has grown more
fierce since 1975.
The political and religious factionalism
has fostered a volatile environment in
which Lebanese warlords have sought mil
itary assistance from neighboring coun
tries. In addition, the global political
environment in which these factions have
been operating made it relatively easy to
receive encouragement and material as
sistance from foreign powers.
Both regional and super powers — Arab
states, Israel and the United States —
have scrambled for influence through di
rect intervention in the divided nation,
with the Americans and the Israelis paying
a heavy price for their actions.

Syrian Versus Arab Involvement
The Arab states have been challenged by
the Lebanese crisis, which has fostered
competition between moderate and radical
Arabs. The Arab states do not constitute a
monolithic group and they rarely take a
unified stand on regional problems. This is
particularly true with such an extraor
dinarily complex situation as is found in
Lebanon. Several of the Arab states —
both moderate and radical — have become
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increasingly involved in Lebanon since
1975, giving the warring factions military
aid to assist them in attaining their political
objectives.
The outbreak of violence in early 1975,
which culminated in a full-scale civil war,
paved the way for major escalation in the
level of foreign intervention in Lebanon. In
particular, Syria saw an opportunity to be
a broker in the Lebanese conflict, giving it
a chance to enforce its long elusive Pax
Syriana. In June 1976, Syria sent its
troops into Lebanon — an action that
marked the first stage in the “internation
alization” of the conflict. Around the same
time, President Hafez al-Assad sur
prisingly shifted his support from the
Muslim leftists and their Palestinian back
ers to the hard-pressed Christian right
ists, who appeared to be on the verge of
defeat.
This Syrian intervention added a poten
tially dangerous dimension to the conflict
and threatened direct foreign military in
tervention by other powers. Arab states in
particular could not sit idle after the Syrian
Army took up positions in the Bekaa Val
ley and started closing in on the Palestin
ians in Beirut. In a hurriedly convened
meeting in Cairo, the Arab League de
cided to send a Pan-Arab peacekeeping
force to replace the Syrian army in
Lebanon.
Assad, however, had no intention of
pulling out of eastern Lebanon. Instead,
he invited other states in the Arab League
to send token forces to join the Syrians in
Lebanon. Assad directly contacted Al
geria’s Hourai Boumedienne and Libya’s
Muammar al-Qaddafi and secured their
approval to send small contingents to join
his army in Lebanon. Faced with this fa it
accompli, the Arab League convinced
Saudi Arabia and the Sudan to contribute
to the emerging Pan-Arab force. This was
a good compromise for Syria: “The Syr
ians agreed to demands from other Arabs

for ‘Arabization’ of the crisis, while re
maining the pre-eminent force.”2 Syria’s
military presence was legitimized by the
mandate from the Arab League, so that
Syria was now viewed neither as occupier
nor as uninvited guest.
The Lebanese Christians were not
pleased with the presence of Libyan and
Algerian troops, both hard-line members
of the Arab “Rejectionist Front.” They
feared that they might join their arch
enemies — the radical Muslim factions and
the Palestinians. But the inclusion of Saudi
and Sudanese forces eased their fears
somewhat. They did not mind letting As
sad try to impose some kind of order in
Lebanon as long as the power of the Chris
tian Maronites — who had dominated the
government since 1943 — remained
intact.
Syria’s mission was to prevent further
escalation of the fighting in order to pave
the way for a political solution but, despite
Assad’s efforts, a political solution has
remained elusive. Repeated attempts to
establish a cease-fire have proved futile
over the years and Syria has instead found
itself caught in the web of Lebanese pol
itics. If anything, the feuding factions have
hardened their positions as a result of the
terrible bloodshed of recent years. This
has led to still further foreign intervention
and has greatly complicated the search for
a political solution to Lebanon’s civil strife.
The Israeli Connection
Israel, which had kept a close watch on the
fast-moving events in Lebanon, saw an
opportunity for intervention to prevent a
victory by a nationalist-leftist-Palestinian
coalition in Lebanon. Since the mid-1970s,
Israel has allied itself with the Christian
Phalangist forces, then headed by Bashir
Gemayel. It also supported Major Saad
Haddad, the commander of the Christian
militia in southern Lebanon.3 Israel has
trained and armed the Christians to fight
the radical Muslims, who were loosely
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allied with the Palestine Liberation Orga
nization (PLO).
The intensified fighting in 1976 led
Israel’s Labor government to discuss ways
to aid the battered Christian forces. In the
months before the Syrian invasion in June
1976, Israel had responded favorably to
Christian pleas for arms and ammunitions.
By May, Israel had begun delivering weap
ons to Christian forces in eastern Leba
non. The deliveries included U. S. M-16 ri
fles, Russian 122-mm. rockets and T-54
tanks.4
Between May and late August, Israel’s
Defense Minister Shimon Peres clan
destinely paid four visits to the Christiancontrolled port of Jounieh, nine miles
north of Beirut. During his third visit, he
was accompanied by Premier Yitzhak
Rabin, who held meetings with Christian
leaders (including former President
Camille Chamoun and President-elect
Elias Sarkis) and a group of moderate
Muslims (including former Premier
Rashid Karami).5
During these meetings, the Israeli offi
cials encouraged the Christians and the
moderate Muslims to form an alliance
against the Palestinians and the Muslim
leftists. More importantly, Israel also
agreed to initiate military action to wipe
out PLO bases in southern Lebanon,
which had posed threats to its security. In
September 1976, Israel’s Foreign Minister
Yigal Allon stated that “a situation will be
created in which we will not permit any
faction to allow the Palestine Liberation
Organization to act against Israel from
Lebanese regions close to the border. ”6
This secret agreement was a turning
point in the Lebanese civil war, as Israel’s
role changed from that of arms supplier to
a limited partner in a coalition against the
Palestinians and Muslim leftists. From
this time on, Israel secretly joined the civil
war in Lebanon and took military action to
help its Christian allies. On September 13,
1976, Time magazine reported that
Israel’s involvement was drawn along the
following lines:
□ Israel [was] maintaining a naval block
ade of several leftist-controlled Lebanese
ports, particularly Sidon and Tyre, thus
keeping arms from reaching beleaguered
leftist-Palestinian forces. The Israelis
[had] so far intercepted 15 ships and tor
pedoed three others that tried to escape
their patrols. Of the 15, six were ordered
to Haifa, where weapons were removed—
and later shipped to Lebanese Christians
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□ Israel [was] now training a battalion of
. . . Lebanese Christian and Muslim
troops in tank warfare at an Israeli base on
the edge of the Sinai desert. . . . When
the training [was] finished, they [would]
be sent back to Lebanon with 38 Amer
ican-made M-50 Sherman tanks.
□ [Israel had] gained what am ounted] to
de facto control over a strip of territory in

. . . Israel and Syria had
both moved against the
Palestinians and the
radical Muslims.

southern Lebanon, reaching up to the
Litani River. . . . In addition, the Israelis
[were] trying to arm and train Lebanese
villagers in the area to guard against a
renewal of Palestinian power.7
Ironically, it had turned out that Israel
and Syria had both moved against the
Palestinians and the radical Muslims. This
was evident in the fact that Syria felt
relatively secure along the confrontation
line in the Golan Heights. Syria withdrew
its five armored divisions along the Israelioccupied Golan Heights and moved them
either to Lebanon or to the eastern border
with Iraq, its hostile neighbor. This action
left only one armored division to protect
Syria’s capital Damascus against attack by
Israel.8
At the beginning, Israel’s Labor govern
ment did not mind Syria’s military inter
vention in Lebanon since Damascus had
established a de facto alliance with the proIsrael, pro-Western Maronite Phalangists. The Israelis were willing to let
Syria try to prevent further escalation of
the fighting in Lebanon in order to find a
political solution that would leave the
power base of the Christian Maronites
intact.

In 1977, the coming to power of the
Likud government, under Menachem Be
gin, led to further escalation of Israel’s
involvement in Lebanon. Begin was deter
mined to wipe out the PLO bases in south
ern Lebanon. To accomplish this objec
tive, Israel first intensified its air raids
against Palestinian positions and, then, in
1978, invaded Lebanon directly. In doing
so, Israel violated U. S. laws that prohibit
the use of American-made weapons in
offensive wars.
Following the invasion of Lebanon,
Israel installed U.S.-made armored hard
ware in the southern part of the country
and ignored repeated American requests
for their removal. Even when the Israelis
later claimed that they had complied with
the U.S. request, photographs taken by
U.S. satellites showed otherwise. Presi
dent Jimmy Carter was outraged by
Israel’s false claims and threatened to ask
Congress to halt arms sales to Israel un
less the weapons were removed from
southern Lebanon. It was only then that
the Begin government bowed to Carter’s
pressure.9
Shortly thereafter, the Israelis with
drew from Lebanon but continued their air
strikes against the Palestinian camps and
continued to provide assistance to Chris
tian forces. It was estimated that Israel
gave the Phalangist militia, under Bashir
Gemayel, some $250 million in military
assistance between 1976 and 1982.10
Israel’s aid was designed to “[turn] the
country into a Phalangist-controlled
state, ”n according to Israeli Defense Min
ister Ariel Sharon, the architect of a sec
ond Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
The Begin government used a bullet
attack on Israel’s ambassador in London as
a pretext for conducting an all-out military
action in June 1982 against the PLO forces
in southern Lebanon. Again, Israel in
vaded Lebanon. It is important to note that
Begin had secured in advance the approval
of U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig
for the Lebanese invasion prior to Haig’s
resignation from the State Department.12
Haig shared Begin’s views on international
terrorism and the danger of a Soviet pres
ence in the Middle East. They both saw a
strategic advantage in destroying the PLO
strongholds in southern Lebanon, and to
stifle radicalism in the area and weaken
Soviet influence in the Arab world.
The Israeli invasion took place after “a
year of unprecedented quiet on the
Lebanese border”13 and at a time when
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Israel knew of a conclusion by the British
government that the PLO had nothing to
do with the attempt a month earlier on the
Israeli envoy’s life. The planning for this
invasion had, in fact, taken place three
months prior to that incident and coin
cided with the time that Israel was about
to turn over the last portion of the Sinai to
Egypt, following the Camp David Accords.
This timing suggests that Begin had
planned to use any excuse to invade
Lebanon in order to rally the Israeli public
behind his government. This is largely
because turning the Sinai over to Egypt
had not only caused a split within the Likud
coalition but also had led to clashes with
militant Israeli settlers in the occupied
Arab territories.
The incident in London was all the li
cense that Begin needed to undertake his
plan to invade Lebanon and to wipe out
PLO bases along Israel’s northern border.
It was, nevertheless, a dangerous prece
dent in the Lebanese crisis, indeed in the
entire Middle East conflict. As journalist/
author Jacobo Timmerman has put it:
For the first time, war was not a re
sponse to provocation. Before, even in the
worst o f cases, it had been preventive. The
understanding of this fact after only four
days of fighting, when there were doubts
about the magnitude of the victory and the
fears had vanished, was perhaps the first
symptom of uneasiness that gripped some
sectors o f the country.14
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Although
the Israeli
condemned by the United Nations, Israel
remained indifferent. This was exem
plified in Begin’s address to 200 American
members of the United Jewish Appeal in
Israel in August 1982: “Nobody should
preach to us.” He indicated that “Israel
would continue the seige of west Beirut as
it saw fit, regardless of international
criticism.”16

Secretary of State George
R Shultz used shuttle
diplomacy to try to
convince the Israeli and
Syrian governments to
pull their armies out of
Lebanon.

The American Rescue Mission

The brutality of the Israeli invasion was
repulsive to many Americans who raised
questions about U.S. military assistance
to Israel. As columnist William Raspberry
Shortly after the invasion, it became
put it:
evident that the Begin-Sharon plan was
Those were American planes and mis
not confined to creating a security zone in
siles and tanks that smashed into
southern Lebanon along Israel’s northern
Lebanon, leaving thousands of dead and
border but sought to force the PLO out of
maimed civilians, women and babies, in
Lebanon altogether. The Israelis swept
their wake. A t some point we will have to
across the country and laid seige on West
. . . deal with the fact that weapons, sup
Beirut in preparation for a final assault on
plied by us on the hard understanding that
the Palestinians who were burrowed
they will be used only for defensive pur
among
several
hundred
thousand
poses, have been used to slaughter inno
Lebanese civilians in the Muslim section
cents who were no threat to Israel.17
of the capital. Israeli jets, gunboats, and
According to a Newsweek magazine poll
artillery repeatedly shelled West Beirut,
“hitting apartment buildings and hospitals conducted in August 1982, “nearly two in
along with Palestinian refugee camps. Ar three Americans disapprove^] of Israel’s
mored Israeli bulldozers tore away PLO march into Lebanon and 43 percent beearthworks so tanks could rumble across lievefd] that Washington should suspend
the Green Line from Christian East Beirut or cut off arms to Israel.”18 This led Presi
to Muslim West. The [Israeli] Army took dent Ronald Reagan to place a ban on the
Beirut International Airport, seized the shipment of cluster bombs, which had
Lebanese Army’s own barracks and finally been widely used by Israel against
stopped in a garden near the refugee Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.
The Israeli invasion cast the net of for
camps. PLO guerrillas stood and fought
with handguns, Kalashnikov rifles and eign intervention in Lebanon still wider.
rocket-propelled grenades.”15
The U. S. and other Western powers now
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became directly involved in Lebanon in an
effort to prevent the Israelis from launch
ing a final assault on the PLO in West
Beirut. As a first step, the U. S. decided to
use diplomacy to try to avert the indis
criminate killing of thousands of Palestin
ian and Lebanese civilians if the Israelis
used force to take over West Beirut.
U.S. special envoy Philip Habib was
dispatched to the Middle East to work out
an agreement to bring about a PLO with
drawal and an end to Israel’s seige of West
Beirut. In early September 1982, a multi
national force — comprising 800 U. S. Ma
rines, 800 French and 500 Italian troops —
arrived in Beirut to supervise the evacua
tion of about 6,000-7,000 PLO fighters
from the Lebanese capital.19 The Palestin
ians went to Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia,
North Yemen, and South Yemen. After the
evacuation, PLO leader Yassir Arafat set
up his headquarters in Tunisia.
Following the evacuation of the PLO
and the end of the Israeli seige of West
Beirut, members of the multinational
force withdrew from the Lebanese capital.
Their departure proved to be premature,
however. It left the Palestinian refugees at
the mercy of the Israelis and their Chris
tian allies, who wanted to sweep every
vestige of the Palestinians out of Lebanon.
Shortly thereafter, in late September
1982, hundreds of Palestinian refugees
were massacred by the Phalangist mili
tiamen at the Sabra and Shatila camps in
Beirut as the Israeli army supposedly was
guarding the camps.20
The massacres raised a dilemma for the
U. S ., which had guaranteed the safety of
the Palestinians after the withdrawal of
the PLO from Beirut.21 This incident
brought back the multinational force for
the second time in five weeks. Its task was
to protect people and maintain peace in
Beirut. The Reagan administration was
now faced with a bigger challenge. It
sought to persuade Israel and Syria to
reach an agreement for troop withdrawal
in order to pave the way for the establish
ment of an independent and unified
Lebanon, free from foreign armies.
Secretary of State George R Shultz
used shuttle diplomacy to try to convince
the Israelis and Syrian governments to
pull their armies out of Lebanon. Syria
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1986
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was unwilling to cooperate, but Shultz got
the Israelis and the Lebanese to sign an
agreement on May 17, 1983 under which
the Israelis agreed to pull out of Lebanon
only when other foreign troops (i.e. the
Syrians) also withdrew. To reward Israel
for its cooperation, the Reagan adminis
tration agreed to release F-16 fighterbombers, which had been withheld “until
the Israeli forces leave Lebanon.” 22
Syria, on the other hand, ignored U. S.
calls for troop withdrawal and used its
strong military and political presence in
Lebanon to pressure President Amin
Gemayel to abrogate the U.S,-sponsored
agreement with Israel. Syrian officials
made it clear that such action was neces
sary if Gemayel wanted to implement his
plan for “national reconciliation.” More
over, Syria’s Lebanese allies refused to
participate in a government of national
unity unless that agreement was re
pudiated.23
Syria’s intransigence frustrated the
U.S., which has no leverage with Presi
dent Assad. In response, the Reagan ad
ministration decided to use the Marines to
prop up the Gemayel government and to
strengthen its role politically and militarily.
This meant that the Marines would play a
limited combat role in Lebanon.
By the fall of 1983, the military situation
was deteriorating rapidly. It was now clear
that foreign intervention was keeping the
civil war brewing in Beirut. In September
1983, for example, Israel decided to re
duce its casualties by pulling out of Beirut
and by abandoning its positions in the
Chouf Mountains. This led to a scramble
among the feuding Lebanese factions for
control of the mountains overlooking
Beirut. In fact, the U. S. used naval gunfire
to prevent the Lebanese Army and Maronite Militia from defeat by Druze fighters
who were entrenched in the mountains.24
This combat role led the Druze to dispute
the U. S. claims to impartiality. Ironically,
it led them to join sides with Syria.
Israel’s abandonment of the Chouf
Mountains meant trouble for the U.S.
Marines; it exposed the flanks of the Ma
rines at the Beirut Airport, leaving them
dangerously vulnerable to sniper fire, ar
tillery shelling, and terrorist attacks.
On October 23, 1983, suicide-bomb
truck attacks on the headquarters of the
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1986

Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University,

U. S. Marines and the French para
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troopers in Beirut left more than 300 peo
ple dead and a score more wounded.
American investigators concluded that the
attack was carried out by the pro-Iranian
Shiite Hizb Allah (Party of God) from the
Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley — a finding
that intensified U.S. conflicts with Syria
and underlined the vulnerability of the
Marines in Beirut. As General John Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

. . . There was little the
U. S. could do to get a
settlement out of the Syr
ians unless the Reagan ad
ministration was willing to
get more involved in the
Lebanese civil war . . .

put it: the main concern of the Marine
contingent “has become one of self-preser
vation. They can’t serve any real purpose
where they are. ”25 On November 7, 1983,
Newsweek commented that “A unit of
1,600 troops was woefully small to have
any real effect upon the Gordian knot of
Lebanese politics, and yet it was quite
large enough to present an inviting target
to terrorists.”26
The bomb attack on the Marine head
quarters threw American policymakers
into a quandary. Reagan’s response was to
stand firm in Lebanon. He was supported
by the majority of Americans, who felt
that the Marines could not simply run in
the face of attack.27 Nevertheless, Reagan
had little choice but to find a way to bring
the Marines home in order to prevent the
bombing incident from becoming a major
issue in his 1984 reelection bid.
U.S. and Israel: Partnership
in Lebanon
In response to the deadly attack on the
Marines and Syrian intransigence, Reagan
decided to develop closer strategic coop
eration with Israel in Lebanon. This deci
sion was made on October 29, just six days

after the devastating attack on the Ma
rines. It was reported that Shultz per
suaded Reagan to revive the idea of a
special political and military relationship
with Israel in order to “confront Syria with
an Israeli-American military threat.”28
This was seen as a move that would com
pel Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, thus
paving the way for the Marines to return
home and also helping to check the spread
of Soviet influence in the Middle East.
This was agreed upon over the objections
of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Wein
berger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of
whom argued that “strategic cooperation”
with Israel could imperil U.S. ties with
such moderate Arab states as Saudi Ara
bia and Jordan.29
France, whose unit suffered heavy
losses from a suicide-bomb attack in Oc
tober, was troubled by this U. S. embrace
of Israel. The French feared that the U. S. Israeli strategic collaboration would “im
pede a settlement in Lebanon rather than
hasten it.”30 They also feared that domes
tic political pressures might lead U. S. Ma
rines into a premature withdrawal and that
American officials eventually might elect
force over diplomacy to break the deadlock
in Lebanon.
The new partnership was an abrupt
change in direction for Reagan’s policy in
the Middle East, especially because he
was abandoning the diplomatic efforts that
had been spearheaded by Saudi Arabia to
get Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon.
This change reflected Reagan’s disen
chantment and frustration with Syria’s re
fusal to withdraw its forces from Lebanon,
an action which would have put the U. S.sponsored Israel-Lebanon agreement into
effect. The U. S. had already endorsed the
Israeli position that the withdrawal of its
troops from southern Lebanon was con
tingent on a simultaneous pullout by Syr
ian forces. Thus, Syrian intransigence
meant that the U.S. Marines must con
tinue to be deployed in Beirut as part of
the multinational peacekeeping force. Yet,
Republican leaders in the United States
were concerned about the safety of Amer
ican forces, following the October attack,
and wanted to bring the Marines home no
later than the summer of 1984, before the
presidential campaign moved into full
swing. As top White House officials put it:
the continued presence of the Marines in
Beirut in 1984 could become “a serious
political liability for Reagan. ” They added,
“if we don’t solve it in the short run, it will
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be critical for us in the long run.”31 They
consequently took measures to ensure the
safety of the Marines, short of pulling
them out of Beirut.
The shift toward U.S.-Israeli coopera
tion certainly did not guarantee that the
U.S. Marines would be coming home
soon. This conclusion was reached by sev
eral Pentagon strategists, who “noting the
speed with which the Soviet Union re
armed Syria [in 1982], doubt[ed] whether
U.S.-Israeli military posturing [would]
impress either the Syrians or the
Soviets.”32
In fact, Assad was in a stronger posi
tion: First, Syria was receiving new, so
phisticated weapons from Moscow in
order to enable it to withstand the American-Israeli military presence and to re
place equipment destroyed earlier. Sec
ond, Syria had consolidated its grip on
eastern Lebanon by helping the rebel fac
tions of the PLO to oust Arafat and his
loyalist troops from Tripoli. Third, by sup
porting factions opposed to President
Gemayel, Syria had become “the key
player in that fractured country’s fu
ture.”33 The result was that there was
little the U. S. could do to get a settlement
out of the Syrians unless the Reagan ad
ministration was willing to get more in
volved in the Lebanese civil war, which had
all the ingredients of a Vietnam-style con
flict. This was certainly an undesirable
prospect for Reagan in an election year.
A series of events over the next few
months suggest that the Reagan adminis
tration was following Israel’s advice to
develop “disincentives” that would pres
sure Syria out of Lebanon: (1) on the eve of
Premier Yitzhak Shamir’s visit to Washing
ton in October, Reagan decided to keep
the battleship USS New Jersey off the
Lebanese coast indefinitely; (2) on De
cember 4, 1983, the U.S. carried out a
belated retaliatory raid on Syrian positions
in Lebanon, which came in the aftermath
of a similar Israeli attack; (3) shortly
thereafter, a policy of instant retaliation
was put in force in an effort to protect the
U. S. Marines in Beirut and to discourage
other terrorist attacks on American tar
gets in the Middle East.
In response to this “gunboat diplo
macy,” Syrian officials denounced U.S.
attacks on their positions in eastern
Lebanon, and made it known that their
government would not “budge an inch”
from its stance on Lebanon despite mount
ing American pressure.34 As one observer
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major war with a possibility of “forcing]
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to
become more deeply and dangerously ent
wined in the Middle East than perhaps
either superpower would like.”35
There was evidence already that the
area of conflict would be widened. On
December 12, 1983, American, French,
and Kuwaiti installations in Kuwait were
bombed. These incidents signalled the be
ginning of a terrorist campaign against

ment to the Lebanese problem and toward
dealing only with the fallout from Israel’s
invasion of Lebanon.
Disengagement or Intervention

By early 1984, it was evident that the
American-Israeli strategic cooperation
had not succeeded in pressuring Assad to
withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon.
Lack of progress toward ending the foreign
military presence in Lebanon resulted in a
new U. S. plan to get the Marines out of
Lebanon in order to avoid another disaster
that could be detrimental to Reagan’s bid
for reelection.
On February 8, Reagan ordered a
There is no guarantee that phased
pullback of the Marines from
Beirut
to
Navy ships offshore. This deci
Assad will succeed in
sion was made following a dramatic turn of
finding a formula that will
events in Lebanon in early February; the
resignation
of Gemayel’s cabinet; the dis
be acceptable to all of the
integration of the Lebanese National
feuding factions.
Army, with Muslim units either defecting
or refusing to fight; and the seizure of West
Beirut by the Druze and Shiite militias.37
Under these circumstances, Reagan was
torn between the need to expand the U. S.
contingent to bolster the Gemayel govern
ment and the need to pull out of the
turmoil in Lebanon. Reagan chose the
latter because the former was too risky in
American interests in the Middle East an election year.
and, possibly, against targets inside the
In doing so, U. S. credibility suffered a
U. S. There was little the U. S. could do to major setback, leaving Gemayel alone to
prevent such attacks.
face the crisis as the British and Italians
Thus, the U.S. policy of cooperation decided to withdraw their units in the
with Israel did not appear to hasten the multinational force out of Lebanon.
return of the Marines. The prospects France, on the other hand, decided to
might have been different if the Israelis stay,38 hoping to convince the United Na
were willing to take over more respon tions to send a peacekeeping force to
sibilities in the war-torn country. Israel, Beirut. Following the U.S. withdrawal,
however, had no interest in getting more Shiite Amal militia took over the positions,
deeply involved in the Lebanese civil war. including the Beirut Airport, held by the
In fact, morale was low in Israel due to the U.S. Marines.
heavy casualties inflicted on Israeli troops
Israel found itself caught in a no-win
by terrorist and guerrilla attacks. Con situation in the longest war in its history.
sequently, Shamir was under pressure to Israeli military analysts pointed out that
end Israel’s involvement in Lebanon as “Israel [was] fully extended in term s of
soon as possible. As a Washington Post personnel and overextended financially.
editorial put it: “The Israelis seem little . . . Israel [was] vulnerable.”39This situa
interested in doing anything in Lebanon tion divided the Israelis and ignited a
these days except cutting their losses on a heated national debate. The Lebanese de
timetable of their own choosing. But this bacle had its toll on Israeli politicians.
stage of the mess is Israel’s doing, and Sharon, the mastermind behind the
Israel has a responsibility to help Amer Lebanese invasion, was forced out of of
ican diplomacy clean it up.”36
fice following the completion of the Com
By making Israel into his preeminent mission of Enquiry’s investigation into the
ally in Lebanon, Reagan ended his stance massacres of Palestinian refugees in West
as a mediator in the Lebanese conflict. Beirut. He was forced to resign from his
One immediate result was shifting his position as defense minister in the Likud
focus away from finding a broader settle government.
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1986
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Moreover, Begin became disillusioned El-Khawas: Lebanon: The Foreign Involvement
as the war dragged on. The Israeli Army
suffered a large number of casualties from
Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupa
tion of southern Lebanon. Surprisingly,
Begin decided to step down from his office
as prime minister, leaving Shamir as the
caretaker until the next election.
When the election results proved to be
inconclusive, the Likud coalition and the
Labor Party decided to form a govern
ment of national unity, with Peres as the
prime minister during the first half of the
term in office. This “unity” government
decided to start pulling out of Lebanon in
January 1985 and to turn southern
Lebanon over to their Christian allies.
Israel also continued to arm and train the
Christian miltia — South Lebanese Army
— in order to bolster the militia’s capabili
ties in southern Lebanon.
In retrospect, the Israeli occupation of
southern Lebanon resulted in the radicalization of Lebanon’s one million Shiites,
who had long been deprived of power and
wealth under the Maronite government.
They turned against Israel, which had
received their support during the early
days of the invasion. This change came
about because of Israel’s heavy-handed
tactics to subjugate the south and Israel’s
close ties with Lebanese Christians. The
Shiite Amal militia was fighting against the
Israelis and their Christian allies. They
particularly resented the capture by the
Israelis (on their way out of Lebanon) of
more than 700 Shiites and their detain
ment at Atlit prison in Israel. The Shiites
resolved to free their fellow citizens at any
cost. This led them to strike not only
against Israel but also against the U.S.,
Israel’s arms supplier and financial backer.
The strategic cooperation between the
U. S. and Israel in Lebanon thus has
turned into a liability for the U. S., which
has become a target of terrorist attacks.
An example was the hijacking of TWA
Flight 847 in June 1985 and the killing of an
American passenger. The Shiite hijackers
demanded the release of more than 700
Shiite detainees in Israel in return for the
release of the TWA plane and its pas
sengers whom they held as hostages.
Faced with the prospect of another hos
tage crisis similar to that of Tehran, Rea
gan was forced to solicit the assistance of
Syria’s President Assad — an old foe —
whom he “had so often attacked in the past
as a prime trouble-maker.” Assad emer
ged as “a key mover in the quest to free
the [American] hostages. ”40
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Assad and Reagan used quiet diplomacy
to convince Shiite Amal leader Nabih Barri
and Israel’s Premier Peres to work out a
compromise to exchange the release of the
TWA hostages in Beirut and the Shiite
detainees in Israel without giving the im
pression that either the U.S. or Israel
capitulated to terrorist demands. The
TWA hostages were the first to be re
leased, followed by a phased release of
Shiite prisoners by Israel.
Assad’s role in the hijacking melodrama
has demonstrated that Syria is undoubt
edly the only power broker capable of
imposing some order in Lebanon.
Gemayel has little choice but to deal with
Assad, who now holds all the cards. This is
particularly true for the following reasons:
First, the U. S. has been shut out of play
ing any meaningful role in the Lebanese
crisis and Israel has become more con
cerned with its own security than with
imposing a solution on the Lebanese prob
lem. Second, Syria has bolstered its posi
tion in Lebanon by allying itself with Druze
and Shiite factions and by only allowing
pro-Syrian Palestinian groups to stay in
the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.
It will certainly be difficult to work out a
political solution for the long-drawn
Lebanese conflict. Syrian officials have
been working with Gemayel to save the
government of national unity, whose sur
vival is vital for a return to normality. They
have been trying to establish and uphold a
cease-fire, which still seems to be elusive.
The immediate task is to end the artillery
duels that have been flaring sporadically
along the Green Line that separates Chris
tian East Beirut from the Muslim West.
This is essential if the warring parties will
ever sit down together to work out a
compromise that would allow a unified
Lebanon.
Conclusion
The decade-old civil strife made Lebanon
an inviting arena for foreign intervention.
Regional forces were the first to exploit
the situation. Both Syria and Israel di
rectly intervened by sending their armies
into Lebanon. Such military intervention
prolonged the internal conflict and led to a
widening of foreign involvement in the
war-torn country.41
The Israeli invasion in the summer of
1982 brought the U. S. and other Western
powers into the Lebanese conflict. They
first sent a multinational force to supervise
the PLO evacuation and to end Israel’s
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turned again to protect lives and maintain
peace in the Lebanese capital following the
massacres of Palestinians in two refugee
camps in West Beirut. The multinational
force then was trapped in Beirut because
of the presence of Syrian and Israeli forces
in Lebanon.
It would take another 17 months before
such foreign involvement would be re
duced. American officials first tried, un
successfully, to convince Syria’s President
Assad to withdraw from Lebanon. Later,
following the suicide bomb attacks on the
headquarters of the U.S. Marines and
French paratroopers in Beirut, American
troops became engaged in a limited com
bat role to support the Gemayel govern
ment, including the shelling of Syrian and
Druze positions by the USS New Jersey.
All of these efforts failed to sway Assad to
pull out of Lebanon. Reagan was left with
no choice but to get the Marines out of
Beirut in order to prevent them from be
coming a damaging issue in his reelection
campaign.
The withdrawal of the U. S. Marines
from Lebanon in February 1984 resulted in
a decision by the British and the Italians to
end their role in the multinational force.
This left Israel with the prospect of being
alone in a no-win situation in Lebanon.
Israel’s involvement in Lebanon had been
costly, especially in the mounting casu
alties and in dividing the Israeli public.
Israel’s change in government in the sum
mer of 1984 resulted in its decision to end
its occupation of southern Lebanon. In do
ing so, it left Syria as the only foreign
power still in Lebanon.
Syria’s Assad is now in a strategic posi
tion to influence the outcome of the inter
nal power struggle in Lebanon. He has not
only backed the Gemayel government but
also has formed alliance with Druze and
Shiite factions. In addition, he has split the
PLO, leaving only pro-Syrian Palestinian
factions in eastern Lebanon. As one
Lebanese observer recently said: “Noth
ing happens in Lebanon without Syria’s ap
proval. ”
There is no guarantee that Assad will
succeed in finding a formula that will be
acceptable to all of the feuding factions.
But at the moment he is the only power
broker able to pressure them to accept a
compromise that will offer a fair distribu
tion of power within the Lebanese govern
ment. This is a necessity because, after
the years of strife and accumulated bitter

memories, there can be no return to the
status quo ante that left the minority Maronite Christians with a monopoly of power
for more than 40 years.
Time will only tell whether Lebanon will
disintegrate or survive as an independent
and unified nation or whether it will remain
under the tutelage of Syria indefinitely. □
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